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Abstract
This Essay touches upon only the most sensitive problems of ensuring Ukraine’s foreign pol-
icy and national security interests in the new geopolitical environment on the European continent.
Obviously, the spectrum of issues related to the subject of this Essay is much more complex and
has especially complex solutions. The European component of Ukraine’s foreign policy, while
extremely important, is not a substitute for Ukraine’s other foreign and domestic policy measures
regarding the strengthening of national security, the successful implementation of socio-economic
reforms, and the building of a market oriented democratic model of national development.
FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS OF UKRAINE
AND PROBLEMS OF EUROPEAN
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INTRODUCTION
As the twenty-first century approaches, the world is in the
midst of dramatic change. Perhaps the most profound transfor-
mations have been taking place on the European continent.
Radical social and political movements in Central and Eastern
Europe during the late 1980s and early 1990s (heralding the end
of the Cold War), the emergence on the political landscape of
several independent states each striving to obtain its own model
of social development, and the collapse of the Soviet Union have
all drastically altered the geopolitical balance in Europe. In-
deed, the present-day political map of this part of the world is
clearly at its most mosaic-like in recent history.
The dramatic events taking place in Europe have raised a
number of new issues, the most significant of which are the need
to maintain further political balance in the region and the need
to ensure the security of the newly independent countries by cre-
ating an effective security system throughout the entire Euro-At-
lantic region. It was quite obvious to the majority of both polit-
ical analysts and statesmen that the so-called "security vacuum"
in Central and Eastern Europe could not exist for long and that
the problems arising from it required immediate resolution.
For several centuries, the political destiny of Ukraine has
largely been determined by historical cataclysms brought on by
the continuous "re-shaping" of the geopolitical space in Central
and Eastern Europe. These events have long complicated the
process of building genuine Ukraine statehood within her eth-
nic boundaries, and have molded the historical pattern of behav-
ior of Ukraine's neighbors.
Studying the path toward Ukraine's independence, we can
assert with certainty that genuine independence is possible only
if Ukraine's national interests, including those in the sphere of
* Ukrainian Ambassador to France and Permanent Representative to UNESCO.
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foreign policy, are effectively protected. As the preamble to the
Concept of the National Security of Ukraine states, "[t] he exist-
ence, self-preservation and progressive development of Ukraine
as a sovereign state is contingent upon a consistent policy of de-
fending national interests." During the first years of indepen-
dence, however, the issue of how to determine and prioritize
Ukraine's national interests was the subject of hot political and
scientific debate within the country. Determining national inter-
ests and providing effective means for their defense are of ut-
most importance to any state. These determinations eventually
define the level of security, not only of the society as a whole, but
of each individual living in it. Furthermore, they are crucial for
the preservation and growth of the nation's spiritual and mate-
rial values.
Even the very concept of national security is being influ-
enced by the rapid revolutionary changes taking place in Eu-
rope. With the accelerated development of science and technol-
ogy, the dramatic increase in trade, the world's transition to a
state of political, economic, and social information interdepen-
dence, it is no wonder that a number of political analysts have
begun speaking of a new phenomenon known as the "virtual
state." Professor Richard Rosecrance says, for example, that
"[t]he virtual state - a state that has downsized its territorially
based production capability - is the logical consequence of this
emancipation from the land .... In economies where capital,
labor and information are mobile and have risen to predomi-
nance, no land fetish remains."1 We can not go so far, however,
as to assert that states are ready to put aside their military, polit-
ical, and territorial ambitions as they struggle for a greater share
of world output, but there is, at least, some evidence that such a
tendency is emerging. As a result, the traditional notion of na-
tional security as solely providing a defense against external mili-
tary threats becomes inadequate and obsolete.
For a long time, the main ingredient in national security was
the need for states to maintain armed forces at substantial quan-
titative and qualitative levels, and the creation of military polit-
ical blocs and coalitions. Other factors, such as economic and
technological potential, the capability to advance, and the moral
1. See Vidomosti Verhovnoi Rady Ukrainy, No. 10, 149 (1997).
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condition of the society were all primarily considered to be pre-
conditions to maintaining adequate military might.
Under present circumstances, however, national security is a
multidimensional and complex idea. In addition to military and
economic components, it now encompasses the subject of de-
mocratization, the establishment of friendly, mutually beneficial
relations among states, and the collective ability of these states to
counter new challenges and threats. Typical national security
concerns now include the proliferation of weapons of mass de-
struction, the trafficking of narcotic drugs, international terror-
ism, organized crime, uncontrolled migration, grave violations
of human rights, and a variety of man-made catastrophes.
This complex and multidimensional notion of national se-
curity is particularly illustrative of the way a young state such as
Ukraine must approach its security concerns. We are also cer-
tain that Ukraine's national security problems are closely related
to the prevailing geopolitical situation in Europe and cannot be
removed from the context of the general global evolution.
I. STRUCTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY
Ukraine's geopolitical position is one of the most important
factors to consider in analyzing its national security needs. As a
natural part of Central and Eastern Europe, Ukraine is focused
both on creating a stable, friendly external environment, which
will enable it to adequately react to political and economic na-
tional security threats, and implementing a crucial internal pro-
gram designed to transform the country into an open, demo-
cratic, prosperous society with a market-oriented economy.
Ensuring that the external factors affecting national security
remain stable is a major priority of Ukraine's foreign policy.
Ukraine occupies a crucial, yet often still unacknowledged, place
in Europe. It is the second largest, and fifth most populous, Eu-
ropean country, and contains within it the geographical center
of Europe. It is situated in the so-called "belt of instability" that
stretches from the Balkans through Transdniester to Transcau-
casia. Ukraine is Russia's largest European neighbor and sepa-
rates it from Central Europe - a region in which Russia, due to
its immense resources and economic potential, will always play
an important role in shaping the political climate. Meanwhile,
Ukrainian Russian relations will, for a long time, determine
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whether or not Russia is reconciled to its current borders and to
exerting its influence in a way that is compatible with the stabil-
ity and independence of its new neighbors. Therefore, any
changes in or around Ukraine are bound to seriously impact the
political climate throughout Europe.
The need to create a special European system of security,
while addressed in a practical way between the Second World
War and the end of the 1980s, had not been as urgent as it has
become lately. New political alliances and international struc-
tures that emerged immediately after the war, generally pro-
vided adequate maintenance of stability on the continent. Some
of them even today play an important role in establishing the
foundation for a new system. One such notable organization is
the United Nations. It was in fact created with the realization
that it was necessary to establish a principally new mechanism
that would make the prevention of future conflicts possible, not
only in Europe but also around the world.
By its mere existence, the United Nations possesses a
unique capability to establish agreed upon international stan-
dards and to reach a global consensus on the common destiny of
mankind. It embodies a unique mechanism to reach agree-
ments and treaties on urgent and painful questions, most of
which have escaped solutions for centuries.
There are, of course, different assessments of the activities
of the United Nations, but no one can deny that it is currently
the only universal mechanism that can maintain international
peace and security. Its system of collective security has, during
times of ideological confrontation, been able to prevent the
world from slipping into a third world war. It is indeed difficult
to imagine the modern world without the United Nations. In
fact, it has been said that if the United Nations did not exist, it
would need to be created.
Ukraine's participation in U.N. activities represents an im-
portant direction in its foreign policy. We see the United Na-
tions as one of the guarantors of the territorial integrity and the
independence of our state. It is worth mentioning here the well-
known statement by the President of the Security Council, issued
in July 1993, regarding the decision by Russia's State Duma con-
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cerning the status of Sevastopol.2 This was an unprecedented
event, especially considering that the respective European orga-
nizations were, at that time, unable to give an adequate response
to this encroachment of the territory of Ukraine.
This brief excursion into the recent past demonstrates that
the processes of regionalization, and the creation of correspond-
ing security structures and mechanisms, in no way diminish the
need for a comprehensive universal approach to existing
problems. The creation of a new security system on the Euro-
pean continent must be based on the universally recognized
principles and norms of international law (particularly those of
the U.N. Charter), and cannot be used at the expense of any
country in the region.
Unfortunately, for a long time, Ukraine had to build its
statehood and its own system of national security in a relatively
unstable international environment, created by its close proxim-
ity to various ethnic and territorial conflicts and new emerging
regional power centers.
The international situation in the regions of Central and
Eastern Europe is characterized by the absence of structured
mechanisms of stability and security. In fact, it is difficult to even
speak of such a system when there is no clear, common under-
standing of what is meant by "Central" and "Eastern Europe."
The notion of a "Central Europe" arose after the Warsaw Treaty
Organization collapsed and the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics ("USSR") ceased to exist and usually includes the former
member states of the so-called "Soviet bloc." In contrast, "East-
ern Europe" generally encompasses the newly independent
states and Russia.
As of today, numerous political analysts, scholars, and states-
men continue to argue about what countries should be included
in each of the regions of Central and Eastern Europe. The an-
swer to this question probably lies in the understanding of the
geopolitical circumstances in the area; and the gravitation of any
particular country toward a corresponding power center. A fur-
ther criterion helping to determine which states belong to which
region is the nature of the interests states have in common with
other states. Any other approach to this problem would have
2. Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Virtual State, 75 FOREIGN AFF. 4, at 45-46
(1996).
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unclear results and could separate a country from its natural
geopolitical space. How could we, in such a case, characterize
the predominant orientation of Baltic states to Scandinavia, or,
say, Belarus's focus on closer ties with Russia and the CIS states?
Ukraine agrees with the approach that is based on the pre-
sumption that the eastern borders of Central Europe are the
western frontiers of the former USSR. In addition, all countries
of the region, except for Belarus, declared as their strategic ob-
jective integration with the European and Euro-Atlantic struc-
tures. Specific steps recently taken in this direction once again
prove the expediency of integration of all the post socialist coun-
tries, as well as the Baltic States, Moldova, and Ukraine, within
the conceptual framework of "Central and Eastern Europe."
Ukraine's European orientation, "its need to integrate into
Europe," reflected in the public opinion, should not be re-
garded as dictated by the current political situation, but rather as
one of a strategic nature. Valuable Ukrainian achievements in
the areas of science, education, religion, and art are inseparable
from the European cultural traditions.
Furthermore, Ukraine's western neighbors have recognized
Ukraine as a Central European nation because of its full-fledged
membership in the Central European Initiative ("CEI").' There
are clear indications that the mentality of European politicians is
gradually changing, that they understand that European orienta-
tion of Ukraine is imminent, and that they recognize Ukraine as
an integral part of the Central European region. Some of the
most remarkable examples of this are the President of Ukraine's
participation in the meeting of the Heads of States of Central
European and Baltic countries; joint political actions by the Pres-
idents of Ukraine, Poland, and Lithuania; the Prime Minister of
Ukraine's invitation to the regular meeting of the Heads of
States of CEFTA;4 the development of cooperation among
Ukraine, Poland, and Germany; and active cooperation with the
Central European States in creating "euroregions."
In the context of Ukraine's participation in "European af-
fairs," it is worthwhile to mention that, inter alia, Ukraine has
3. See U.N. Criticizes Russia Claim to Sevastopol, U.P.I., July 20, 1993, available in
LEXIS Nexis Library VPI File.
4. See European Forum Admits 5 Eastern Members, U.P.I., June 1, 1996, available in
LEXIS Nexis Library VPI File.
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been a contributor of troops to the U.N. peace-keeping opera-
tions in the former Yugoslavia, it has provided military staff to
the multinational Implementation Forces in Bosnia and Herze-
govina, and has taken part in resolving the conflict in Moldova
where it is one of the guarantors of the related memorandum's
implementation.5
It is now commonplace to speak of the importance of an
independent, democratic Ukraine playing a stabilizing role not
only in the Central and Eastern European regions but in Europe
as a whole. Ukraine's location and its great scientific and indus-
trial potential inevitably give it the role of a natural linchpin in
the European security environment.
Any other arrangement would not only bring about a whole
gamut of new problems in defending Ukraine's interests but
most likely would also create a real danger of undermining its
capacity to adequately respond to challenges to its national se-
curity. At the same time, we understand that there are no easy
solutions in international politics, and that there does not exist a
single mechanism that alone could provide solutions to all of the
key questions of a state's existence or absolute security guaran-
tees to that state.
Since Ukraine prefers political and diplomatic means to
solve security problems, its efforts in the area of foreign policy
are focused on promoting the establishment and development
of reliable international security mechanisms. The creation of a
Euro-Atlantic security zone is a complex process in which both
individual countries and multilateral structures, such as OCSE,6
the European Union ("EU"), NATO, the Western European
Union ("WEU"), the Council of Europe, and others play an im-
portant role.
Having chosen European orientation as one of its priorities,
Ukraine cannot remove itself from the main developments in
this region. Ukraine's strategy for achieving integration into the
European and trans-Atlantic structures emanates not only from
5. 1995 American Society of International Law, Czech Republic-Hungay-Poland-
Slovak Republic: Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), 34 I.L.M. 3, 3 (1995).
6. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe ("OSCE") was for-
merly named Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe ("CSCE"). The
Memorandum on the Settlement of Transdniester problem signed on May 8, 1997 by
the Presidents of Moldova, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, and by the leadership
of Transdniester.
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the fact that Ukraine is drawn to Europe for political, historical,
and cultural reasons, but also from its pragmatic need to meet
the existing economic requirements of our country.
Ukraine's active participation in the building of a new secur-
ity system in Europe involves the development and strengthen-
ing of its relations within several contexts. It must consider
NATO's transformation and enlargement, the evolution of the
Security Model for the twenty-first century under the OCSE
framework, the EU's future enlargement, new WEU functions,
and the development of regional and subregional processes.
Today, it is universally recognized that the future security
structure in Europe is to be based on the principles of indivisi-
bility, comprehensiveness, and partnership. In other words, it is
to be based on collective, rather than individual, actions. The
effectiveness of the interaction between these elements would re-
sult from a state of mutual complementarity and a meaningful
distribution of functions. In Ukraine's view, this method is the
only way to secure the vitality and efficiency of the future Euro-
pean security architecture.
As has already been mentioned, the development of a new
European security architecture has probably become the most
important and acute issue in the post-Cold War period. Its sig-
nificance has further increased because of the fact that practical
steps were taken to solve the problems surrounding NATO's en-
largement. It is clear that this reality requires Ukraine to deter-
mine its own clear-cut strategy for participation in a new collec-
tive security system.
II. UKRAINE - NATO RELATIONSHIP
The development of Ukraine's relation with NATO should
be considered in light of the fact that NATO itself is not a rigid
and unchangeable entity. Having taken the lead in the develop-
ment of a new Euro-Atlantic security system, and having put for-
ward the proposal to establish cooperation among all the coun-
tries of the region for the sake of creating a safe Europe, NATO
has vividly demonstrated its potential for transformation, and for
gradual adaptation to new realities.
Today, one can confidently state that we have witnessed the
transformation of this Alliance from a closed military and polit-
ical bloc into a union of democratic states and that this union is
[Vol. 21:45
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an important element of the Pan-European security structure
whose declared objectives are to maintain stability and to pro-
mote democratic ideas on the continent. Proceeding from this
very understanding, Ukraine has repeatedly stated that it does
not consider NATO to be an organization that poses a threat to
its national interests. Rather, as President Leonid Kuchma of
Ukraine stated in an interview, NATO was "the only real guaran-
tor of security on the continent. '
Ukraine has readily responded to NATO's suggestion to the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe that partnership rela-
tions be established and Ukraine was the first of the former So-
viet Republics to express its approval of NATO's transformation.
In addition, it first joined the North Atlantic Council for Cooper-
ation ("NACC") in 1992 and then the Partnership for Peace
("PFP") Program in 1994. By establishing active contacts,
Ukraine has demonstrated its view that these organizations are
important vehicles for regular political consultation between
NATO and both the former members of the Warsaw Pact, and
the newly independent States. It has further shown that it con-
siders them to be important elements of the common structure
of stability and security in Europe whose aim is to further de-
velop a deepening cooperation in the region. The creation of
NACC and the inauguration of PFP were, at that time, steps in
the right direction, that helped to avoid new "lines of division" in
Europe, and helped to strengthen stability and security in the
OCSE region as a whole.
Meanwhile, Ukraine did not overestimate the importance of
its participation in NACC and PFP and was constantly looking
for new ways to improve existing forms of cooperation and to
initiate new ones. Recently, in view of the changes that have
taken place in Europe since the creation of NACC, including the
significant development and deepening cooperation with re-
spect to security, the military cooperation within PFP, and
NATO's plans to increase its membership, it was quite natural
that the idea to integrate all existing forms of NACC-PFP cooper-
ation within the new structure would generate broad support.
Indeed, the foreign ministers of the North-Atlantic Council and
the NACC who met in the City of Sintra in Portugal agreed on
the establishment of a Council of Euro-Atlantic Partnership
7. See ABC-Clio, Inc., 1995. The CSCE was formally created on July 3, 1973. Id
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("CEAP") which would be a single cooperation mechanism pro-
viding the framework for the considerable deepening and
strengthening of the political component of the PFP Program.'
Ukraine regards the establishment of this new structure as a
continuation of the process of strengthening partnership rela-
tions among the European countries. It also views it as another
step toward intensified cooperation between NATO members
and other partner countries. At the same time, it is quite obvi-
ous that the success of CEAP will, to a great extent, depend not
only on CEAP's ability to preserve and build upon what has been
achieved within NACC and PFP, but also on CEAP's ability to
formulate new levers in adopting collective decisions on issues
that are of interest to both NATO and non- NATO members.
This condition is crucial to CEAP's ability to become a solid com-
ponent of the emerging system of entities such as Euro-Atlantic
security alongside the OCSE, EU, WEU, Council of Europe, and
NATO.
While analyzing NATO's enlargement within this context,
one must be surprised by the approach of numerous political
analysts and public figures who regard the issue only as the intro-
duction of a procedure for negotiations between NATO and the
individual countries of Central and Eastern Europe. These com-
mentators ignore the structural changes that have taken place
within the Alliance that establish partnership relations with all
the interested countries of the region. This question, viewed
from a geopolitical perspective, is really part of a more general
issue: the need to create an effective collective security system
on the continent. Even now one may confidently predict that
the meeting in Madrid9 will be historically significant to the fur-
ther development of the security system on the European conti-
nent, and that it will help to shape the external conditions mak-
ing consideration of the national interests of the countries in the
region, including Ukraine, possible.
Naturally, under these circumstances, generating Ukraine's
position on the expansion of NATO and providing a framework
8. See Juliusz Urbanowicz, Oleksy's Moscow Visit: The Nagging Doubts About NATO,
WARSAW VOICE, May 21, 1995.
9. The American Society of International Law, NATO-Russia: Founding Act on Mu-
tual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and The Russian Federation, 36 I.L.M.
1006, 1006 (1997).
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for its relations with the organization required a balanced yet
flexible approach.
Ukraine's foreign policy developed when there existed vari-
ous views within the society about the orientation of an in-
dependent state, and various ideas for improving its status in the
world. Under the influence of domestic and international devel-
opments, however, Ukraine's foreign policy has since undergone
an evolution. Over a relatively short period of time, Ukraine has
traveled a path from its original intention to become a perma-
nently neutral state, as proclaimed in the Declaration on the
State Sovereignty of Ukraine,1" to its current state of having en-
tered into relations of distinctive partnership with NATO. 1
Today, despite different opinions regarding Ukraine's pro-
claimed intention to become a neutral state, one can hardly un-
derestimate the importance of such a proclamation to the for-
mation of a new state, and to the protection of its foreign inter-
ests in the existing political environment. It is clear that the
proclaimed intention to become a permanently neutral state
played a positive role in the first years of independence when
Ukraine was under pressure to join a new military alliance
formed on the territory of the former Soviet Union. However,
in July 1993, Ukraine's neutrality underwent significant changes.
The foreign policy guidelines adopted by Ukraine's Verkhovna
Rada clearly state that its proclaimed intention should not inter-
fere with its full-scale participation in the All-European security
system. 12 The guidelines indicated Ukraine's readiness to adapt
its foreign policy to the new realities in Europe and its ability to
adequately respond to geopolitical changes in the region.
Moreover, Ukraine's Constitution, adopted on June 28,
1996, has no provision proclaiming neutrality or non-participa-
tion in military alliances either as a means of ensuring national
security or as a condition to its existence.
A provision of the National Security Framework which con-
cerns Ukraine's participation in multilateral security arrange-
ments, including regional arrangements, is a major guideline of
10. Declaration on the State Sovereignty of Ukraine, July 16, 1990, Section IX.
11. NATO, Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine (July
9, 1997) <http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/ukrchrt.htm> [hereinafter NATO-
Ukraine Charter].
12. Guidelines of Ukraine's Foreign Policy, Reports of Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada
(1993).
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the State policy in this area and reflects the significant changes
that have taken place in the military and geopolitical status of
Ukraine. 3
Ukraine, itself, did not raise the issue of its participation in
NATO, in part, because neither it nor NATO was prepared to
take such a step. Ukraine also had to deal with the realities of
NATO's expansion to the East. The major tasks of Ukraine were
to prevent potential negative consequences of this process, to
avoid letting Ukraine turn into a buffer state, and to maximally
ensure its own national security interests. Ukraine, in general,
did not oppose NATO enlargement, but believed that its own
security interests had to be accommodated in that process.
As mentioned above, a simplified analysis of the decision to
expand NATO could not adequately portray the evolving secur-
ity issue on the European continent. I believe that the main
questions regarding NATO's expansion should not be "who
should join?," "when?" and "in what sequence?," but rather "how
can an efficient instrument guaranteeing the security of nations
that remain outside NATO be created?" Ukraine is confident
that NATO's expansion can have a positive effect on the overall
security in Europe only if the principles of its expansion, agreed
upon by the Alliance, are observed. These principles of expan-
sion include:
- preserving NATO's openness in the future;
- ensuring that a process of expansion is accompanied by
strengthening cooperation between NATO, other struc-
tures, and all concerned nations of the regions;
- ensuring that NATO moves toward a collective security sys-
tem; and
- respecting the interests and concerns of all the states of the
region in the process of expansion, based on the principle
of indivisible security.
To unconditionally comply with the universally accepted
principle of indivisible security, and to prevent the emergence of
new "lines of division" in Europe or "gray zones" during the
practical implementation of NATO's expansion, it is necessary
to adequately guarantee Ukraine's national security interests, in-
cluding the refusal to recognize any claims to Ukrainian territory
from any other country. Another principal issue for Ukraine is
13. Id.
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that of non-deployment of nuclear arms on the territories of new
NATO members.
The establishment of distinctive partnership relations with
NATO is therefore viewed by Ukraine as one of the most impor-
tant guarantees of its interests in the face of NATO's expansion.
Intensive consultations, which have been held on this issue over
the last year and a half, have finally led to the adoption of the
Charter on distinctive relations between Ukraine and NATO.' 4
This document outlines the parties' political obligations regard-
ing their relations, determines the areas for consultations and
cooperation, and defines practical mechanisms of interaction on
the most vital issues of European security.
Particularly important is the Charter's provision recognizing
the roles of Ukraine and NATO in creating the Euro-Atlantic
security system. Also important is its acknowledgement of the
need to develop "distinctive and effective" partnership relations
that would promote stability and common democratic values in
Central and Eastern Europe. 15 NATO, for its part, has expressed
support for Ukraine's sovereignty and independence, for its ter-
ritorial integrity, for the inviolability of its borders, and for its
democratic and economic development. 6
A concrete mechanism for the implementation of the Char-
ter provisions, including that which contemplates consultations
between the parties, will become a principally innovative ele-
ment in Ukraine-NATO relations. Specifically, the Charter
would initiate the work of the Ukraine-NATO Commission, and
would require the Commission to meet at the North Atlantic
Council level no less than twice a year.' v A. crisis consultative
mechanism would also be set up to conduct joint consultations
should Ukraine perceive an immediate threat to its territorial
integrity, its political independence, or its security. The Charter
further envisions, for example, a Ukrainian military liaison mis-
sion to NATO (in Brussels) and a NATO mission in Kyiv. 8 In
fact, the Commission is the first mechanism of its kind for con-
sultations and cooperation between NATO and a Central-East-
ern European country.
14. NATO-Ukraine Charter, supra note 11.
15. Id..
16. Id. at para. 1.1.
17. Id. at para. IV.12.
18. Id. at para. IV.11.
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The importance of signing the Charter on distinctive part-
nership relations between Ukraine and NATO goes beyond the
framework of merely bilateral relations. The Charter is one of
elements essential for securing Ukraine's national interests in
the midst of NATO expansion. It is furthermore an extremely
important component of the general development of the Euro-
pean security structure because it facilitates the creation of a
more stable environment to achieve the ambitious goal of a sin-
gle and comprehensive security system in Europe. Because of
this agreement, it is therefore clear that Ukraine is among the
leading countries in the development of the system.
III. UKRAINE'S DEVELOPMENT OF AMICABLE RELATIONS
WITH ITS NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES
Naturally, it is crucial for any nation to develop friendly,
mutually advantageous relations with its neighbors if it is to pro-
tect its own national security interests. Clearly, therefore, while
the politically elite of some of Ukraine's neighbors have territo-
rial claims against Ukraine, the fostering of such amicable rela-
tions will long remain a high-priority in Ukraine's foreign policy.
There are, however, other reasons why Ukraine has a
profound interest in developing good relations with its neigh-
boring countries. Common interests in ensuring market re-
forms and continued production growth, in making tecnological
advances, in improving competitiveness in the world market, in
combating crime and corruption, in controlling migration
processes, in halting drug and arms trafficking, and in minimiz-
ing the consequences of technological and natural disasters, all
require the efficient cooperation among neighbors. Today, it is
also evident that the emergence of local hot-beds of instability in
one country can have political and economic effects in other
countries, potentially threatening those other countries' na-
tional security interests.
Within this context, it must be emphasized that the rela-
tions must not only be friendly but also mutually advantageous.
Ukraine has never intended to strengthen its own security or ob-
tain economic advantages by either diminishing the security of
its neighbors or consciously limiting their interests. However,
Ukraine also will not allow itself to be threatened, blackmailed,
or intimidated. Mutually beneficial relations require the under-
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standing of common interests in maintaining the region's stabil-
ity, the unacceptability of isolated approaches toward problem
solving, the readiness to reasonably compromise, and due re-
spect for both historical and present day realities.
I have already mentioned Ukraine's participation in resolv-
ing the situation in the Transdniester region. I could also re-
count other events that were extremely important to the devel-
opment of bilateral relations between Ukraine and its neighbor-
ing countries, and to the strengthening of Ukraine's
international positions in general. A specific example is the
signing of the Treaty on the State Border between Ukraine and
the Republic of Belarus. 9 This treaty sets a precedent for suc-
cessfully resolving issues relating to the legal boundaries be-
tween the subjects of the former Soviet Union. Other examples
include the signing of the Joint Declaration Towards Under-
standing and Unity, achieved during a visit to Ukraine by Polish
President A. Kwasnievwski, and the signing of the Treaty on
Good Neighbourly Relations and Cooperation between Ukraine
and Romania.
Strengthening the principle of strategic partnership be-
tween Ukraine and Poland was a major success coming out of
the Polish President's visit to Ukraine. According to many ana-
lysts and diplomats, the signing of the Joint Declaration, which
testified to the willingness of Ukraine and Poland to construc-
tively tackle serious problems they each inherited from their
long common history, was a courageous and extraordinary step.
The Joint Declaration also ensures continuity in protecting the
interests of Polish citizens of Ukrainian descent who suffered
from the forced deportation in April 1947 known as "Operation
Wisla."
By signing the political treaty with Romania, Ukraine virtu-
ally concluded the process of establishing the legal basis for rela-
tions with its neighboring states. The provisions included in the
treaty not only reflect both countries' belief in the common in-
ternational legal principles that neither existing national bor-
ders nor the rights of national minorities shall be violated, but
also set forth civilized mechanisms for solving other problems
still existing in the bilateral relation. Of particular importance is
the provision within the treaty that transfers to the International
19. Id. at para. III. 10.
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Court of Justice the issues of delimitation of the borders of the
continental shelves and of the exclusive economic zones. This
transfer occurs automatically if the two sides have not reached a
mutually acceptable solution within two years after the treaty's
entry into force. 20
The events mentioned above have not only facilitated a final
solution to the issue of international legal recognition of
Ukraine's existing borders, but have also made an important
contribution to ensuring stability and security in Europe. It is
obvious, however, that Ukraine's relations with Russia, its largest
neighbor, occupy a special place in the foreign relations arena.
It is hard to overestimate the important role that this relation-
ship plays not only in Ukraine's own foreign policy but also in
the creation of an effective collective security system on the Eu-
ropean continent.
Ukraine has consistently pursued a course of normalized re-
lations with Russia. However, this pursuit was not always met
with understanding from the other side. Frequently, the devel-
opment of bilateral relations became a hostage to the influential
political forces within Russia which preached toughness in both
domestic and foreign policy. This ideology was aimed at restor-
ing the "Great Russia" as a world power and regaining its domi-
nation within the framework of the geopolitical space of the for-
mer Soviet Union. One sign of such a policy was Russia's procla-
mation that it was ready to interfere in the internal affairs of the
neighboring states that have emerged in the post-Soviet space in
order to protect the so called "Russian speaking population."
Until recently, Russia had also been reluctant to define its
borders with Ukraine, leaving a dangerous question mark over
the status of Crimea. A confrontational approach to this matter,
however, would only have had an opposite effect.
There is no doubt that Russia remains one of Ukraine's pri-
ority partners, not merely in the area of politics. Ukraine is still
tied to the economic complex of the former members of the
USSR, whose infrastructure was almost entirely built around
cheap Russian energy sources that had provoked high energy
consumption by industry, particularly in Ukraine. Russia also
continues to be Ukraine's main economic partner, the major
20. American Society of International Law, Treaty on Understanding, Cooperation and
Good Neighborliness, 36 I.L.M. 340, 340 (1997).
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supplier of necessary energy sources and an important pur-
chaser of the products of Ukraine's heavy industry.
The situation, to a great extent, is being complicated be-
cause of Russia's own internal instability, which could result in
the country's retreat from its current move toward democracy.
It is obvious that such a turn of events would be undesirable and
even threatening to both the security of Ukraine and to the
world community as a whole.
It is quite understandable that the relationship between the
two largest countries in Central and Eastern Europe could not
forever remain unregulated and characterized by a mix of con-
tradictions and confrontation. We are satisfied that the need to
develop good neighborly relations with Ukraine is slowly becom-
ing the prevailing opinion among the pragmatic politicians in
Russia. In addition, although it is obvious that it will take several
generations before such a view becomes the dominant one, the
latest events do provide hope that the era of Russia's non-ac-
ceptance of an independent Ukraine and the attempts to return
it to within the orbit of Russia's dominating influence is over.
The documents that were signed during President Boris Yeltsin's
state visit to Ukraine, most importantly the Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation and Partnership, opened a new era in Ukraine-Rus-
sia relations, and bring the expectation that bilateral coopera-
tion will reach a new level.
Ukraine welcomes the normalization of :relations between
NATO and Russia, and particularly, the signing of the Founding
Act.21 In Ukraine, the establishment of a dialogue between
NATO and Russia has always been considered important to the
stability and security on the European continent. To a great ex-
tent, it would define the development of the Euro-Atlantic part-
nership for the foreseeable future. As Ukrainian President Leo-
nid D. Kuchma said during an interview: "You cannot build a
security system in Europe without Russia. Cooperation with Rus-
sia is currently the largest challenge for Europe and the world. 22
The Founding Act in fact symbolizes the trend toward coopera-
tion among all nations of the region as well as establishment of a
unified and comprehensive twenty-first century system of secur-
21. American Society of International Law, Treaty on Understanding, Cooperation and
Good Neighborliness, 36 I.L.M. 340 (1997).
22. PoLITYKA, June 15, 1996, at 15.
1997]
62 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL
ity and stability in the Euro-Atlantic space. It furthermore de-
fines a new dimension to this cooperation.
While analyzing the issues of European security, it is impos-
sible to ignore the specific role of the United States, which, dur-
ing the post war period, played a key role in maintaining stability
on the continent. Maintaining good relations with the United
States is among the top priorities of Ukraine's foreign policy.
Proclaiming the intention to upgrade these relations to the level
of a strategic partnership, and the subsequent practical measures
already undertaken in this direction, have, undoubtedly, been
an important factor in strengthening the political and economic
independence of Ukraine.
The intensity of bilateral relations between Ukraine and the
United States have reached a level so great that there now ap-
pears to be a need to search for non-standard approaches to sev-
eral issues. Among these are the need to maintain the high
numbers and effective implementation of existing agreements,
as well as adequately coordinate cooperation on a broad range
of problems that have long since expanded beyond the frame-
work of a traditional bilateral relations agenda.
A next logical step was the establishment of the Ukrainian-
American Inter-Governmental Commission, co-chaired by
Ukrainian President Leonid D. Kuchma and U.S. Vice President
Albert Gore. The Commission's first meeting, held on May 16,
1997, showcased the United States' willingness to continue devel-
oping a strategic partnership with Ukraine as a Central-Euro-
pean nation.
It should also be noted that Ukrainian-American relations
have been marked by different social and political dynamics.
The concentration of attention on Russia and the application of
the so-called "collective approach" toward other countries that
emerged on the post-Soviet space, had negatively affected these
relations at their initial stage. Another complication arose with
the issue of the future of the nuclear weapons remaining on the
Ukrainian territory after the disintegration of the former Soviet
Union.
Nuclear policy issues, particularly with respect to nuclear
missiles, were long seen as the most important matters with-
in the Ukraine-United States-Russia triangle. These issues had
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greatly influenced both the definition and practical implementa-
tion methods of Ukraine's national security strategy.
Unfortunately, the space constraints of this Essay do not
permit detailed coverage of all the aspects of a Ukraine nuclear
policy. Rather, the gist of its approach is the realization that
problems exist in this area. Ukraine was the first nation in the
world to voluntarily abandon its nuclear weapons arsenal and,
thus, set an example for other states to follow, concerning the
possibility of moving to a nuclear-free world. The important
steps in this direction were Ukraine's signing of the Lisbon Pro-
tocol on May 23, 1992,23 the ratification of the Treaty on Strate-
gic Offensive Weapons and the Lisbon Protocol on November
18, 1993, the signing of the Tripartite statement by the Presi-
dents of Ukraine, the United States and Russia on January 14,
1994,24 Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera-
tion of Nuclear Weapons on November 16, 1994,25 and finally,
the signing of the Treaty on the Comprehensive Ban on Nuclear
Tests on October 27, 1996.26
The principal moment, in my view, however, was providing
Ukraine with international security guarantees. The pertinent
memorandum ("Memorandum") was signed in Budapest during
the OSCE summit by the Presidents of Ukraine, Russia, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. 27 Separate assurances
were also given by China and France. This Memorandum set an
important precedent in international relations by facilitating the
solution to the issue of Ukraine's nuclear status, the fading of
suspicions concerning Ukraine's "nuclear ambitions," and the
beginning of honest and open dialogue with our partners. This
event became an important piece of the political and legal rec-
23. The Protocol to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Of-
fensive Arms, May 23, 1992, U.S.-Russia-Ukraine-Belarus-Kazakhstan, S. TREATY Doc.
No. 32, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) [hereinafter Lisbon Protocol].
24. Trilateral Statement, issued in Moscow, Jan. 14, 1994, by President Clinton of
the United States, Yeltzin of the Russian Federation and Kravchuk of Ukraine, 5 U.S.
Dep't St. Dispatch, 19-20 (Supp. 1, 1994).
25. 7 I.L.M. 809 (1968).
26. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, U.N. Document A/RES/50/
245, September 17, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1439 (1996).
27. The full name is: the Memorandum on the Guarantees of Security in Connec-
tion with the Accession of Ukraine to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons.
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ognition of Ukraine's territorial integrity and inviolability of its
borders. Both are vital to our national security.
Today, as in the past, legal experts actively debate whether
this document is legally binding on the participating states.
Leaving aside the theoretical aspects of this issue, Ukraine has
always viewed the Memorandum as an international legally bind-
ing instrument. The Memorandum's provisions, in essence, un-
doubtedly constitute international legal obligations reflecting
generally recognized norms and principles of international law.
Time will eventually reveal the fate of this Memorandum. A
provision of the Charter on the Distinctive Partnership between
Ukraine and NATO contains NATO's express support for the
guarantees of security that were given to Ukraine by the five nu-
clear powers in the NPT. This demonstrates that the agreement
was not merely a past achievement. Indeed, some time in the
future, the principles incorporated in this Memorandum might
be used as the basis for a new structure of European security,
since guaranteeing Ukraine's security means guaranteeing the
security of one of the largest nations in Europe.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, one should realize that this Essay touches
upon only the most sensitive problems of ensuring Ukraine's for-
eign policy and national security interests in the new geopolitical
environment on the European continent. Obviously, the spec-
trum of issues related to the subject of this Essay is much more
complex and has especially complex solutions. The European
component of Ukraine's foreign policy, while extremely impor-
tant, is not a substitute for Ukraine's other foreign and domestic
policy measures regarding the strengthening of national secur-
ity, the successful implementation of socio-economic reforms,
and the building of a market oriented democratic model of na-
tional development.
It is the successful resolution of the whole complex of
problems referred to above, along with other factors such as the
geographical location, historic experiences, and powerful scien-
tific and industrial potential that will ensure the necessary condi-
tions that will enable Ukraine to become one of the major guar-
antors of political and economic stability in Europe. This will, to
a great extent, determine the configuration of the new architec-
ture of European security in the twenty-first century.
